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This paper analyzes the implications of effective taxation of labor for profits and, hence, the 
location decision of a multinational enterprise. We set up a stylized partial equilibrium model 
and, presuming that worker effort is a function of net wages, assume that a higher employee-
borne tax burden reduces effort. In turn, this raises a firm’s production costs and reduces 
efficiency. Accordingly, we show that a higher employee-borne income tax negatively 
influences a multinational’s profit by reducing manager effort. Furthermore, we compile data 
on personal income tax profiles for 49 economies and the year 2002. We decompose tax 
profiles into the component borne by employers and that borne by employees. We then 
determine effective tax rates for employees across four centiles of the distribution of gross 
wages: 33, 100, 167, and 500 percent of the average, following the OECD’s Taxing Wages 
Approach. Apart from describing features of the personal income tax data, we use them to 
shed light on their role for bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks among the 
economies considered. Not surprisingly, personal income tax rates turn out relatively less 
important than profit tax rates for bilateral FDI stocks. The employee-borne part of labor 
taxes determines bilateral FDI significantly different from zero: both a higher employee-borne 
tax rate on average wages and, in particular, an increase in the progression from the average 
wage to five times the average wage is less conducive to headquarters location and, hence, 
reduces a country’s bilateral outward FDI stocks. 
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April 2008 1 Introduction
T h ev a s tl i t e r a t u r eo nt h ee ﬀects of taxation on the investment decisions of multinational
ﬁrms has until now focused almost entirely on the taxation of proﬁts and, hence, capital
(see for instance Devereux and Griﬃth 1998, Janeba 1998, Hauﬂer and Schjelderup 2000,
Davies 2003, Devereux and Hubbard 2003). This focus roots primarily in the presumption
that capital is mobile across borders while labor is not. Recently, economists working at
the interface of multinational ﬁrm activity and taxation developed interest also in issues
related to the taxation of labor, in particular, of high-skilled workers such as managers
and technicians. With the cross-border mobility of skilled workers, three questions surface
with respect to taxation. First, whether the taxation of labor and, in particular, of well-
paid labor matters at all for multinational activity such as foreign direct investment.
Second, we may ask about the quantitative impact of personal income taxation relative
to the taxation of proﬁts. Third, one may be interested in the relative importance of
employee-borne versus employer-borne taxes for a multinational ﬁrms’ decision where to
locate headquarters.
We set up a stylized partial equilibrium model to analyze the implications of eﬀective
taxation of labor for proﬁts and, hence, the location decision of a multinational enterprise
(MNE).1 According to the comparative static analysis, wage taxes borne by high-skilled
employees (or managers) reduce an MNE’s proﬁts due to reduced skilled worker eﬀort
which, in turn, leads to higher production costs. Higher employer-borne taxes on high-
skilled labor ceteris paribus have a direct negative impact on a ﬁrm’s proﬁts, whereas
higher employee-borne taxes indirectly aﬀect an MNE’s proﬁts by reducing managers’
eﬀort. With higher employee- or employer-borne taxes on well-paid labor in a country and
high-skilled labor services in MNEs primarily tied to headquarters (as typically assumed
in models of MNEs, see Markusen, 2002), it becomes more proﬁtable to set up an MNE
abroad and serve consumers in that country through the local subsidiary of a foreign-
1Implicitly, also the literature on the impact of labor costs on MNE activity considers employee- and
employer-borne taxes on wages (see Markusen, 2002 and Becker et al. 2005). These studies, however, do
neither decompose labor cost into the ‘net wage’ and the ‘tax’ component, nor do they disentangle the
employees’ and the employers’ tax burden in the role for MNEs.
1owned MNE. Consequently, we argue that higher taxes on well-paid workers’ wages reduce
a country’s attractiveness for headquarters location and, hence, its outward foreign direct
investment.
We infer the hypotheses about the impact of employee- and employer-borne taxes
on labor (besides taxes on proﬁts) on bilateral outward FDI in a large cross-sectional
data-set covering 49 economies in the year 2002. For this analysis, we have to compile
data on labor taxation ﬁrst, since such data are not available for as large a cross-section
of countries. We follow the Taxing Wages approach of the OECD (see Heady, 2004) to
d e t e r m i n et h ea v e r a g ea n dm a r g i n a le ﬀective tax burden on labor which includes state
and local income taxes as well as social security contributions. This approach allows
decomposing countries’ tax proﬁles into the component borne by employers and the one
borne by employees. Speciﬁc a l l y ,w ec o m p u t et h et a xw e d g ef o ras i n g l ee m p l o y e ee a r n i n g
33%, 100%, 167% and 500% of the average wage in the manufacturing sector for each of
the 49 economies. Apart from the importance of average tax levels, we can then determine
the role of a tax system’s degree of labor tax progressivity which should inﬂuence a well-
paid (high-skilled) individuals’ eﬀort and, in turn, MNE location and FDI, according to
the model.
Using these eﬀective tax rates and bilateral outward FDI stocks among 49 countries
for the year 2002, our ﬁndings document that the employee-borne part of labor taxes
determines bilateral FDI signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero: both a higher employee-borne
tax on average wages and, in particular, a higher progression from the average wage to
ﬁve times that wage seems less conducive to headquarters location and, hence, reduces a
country’s bilateral outward FDI.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up a stylized model
of labor taxation and determines the impact of the latter on an MNE’s proﬁts through
two channels: a direct negative eﬀect of employer-borne labor taxes and an indirect one of
employee-borne taxes through reduced eﬀort of high-skilled workers and higher production
cost on ﬁrm proﬁts. Section 3 presents the OECD’s Taxing Wages approach we rely upon
and provides descriptive statistics on employer- and employee-borne taxes in our sample
2of countries. The ﬁndings from the empirical analysis of the impact of labor taxes on
bilateral FDI are summarized in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a summary
of the most important ﬁndings.
2 Why should personal income taxes matter for MNE
location and activity?
At ﬁrst glance, it seems obvious why a ﬁrm cares about employer-borne taxes of high-
skilled workers who are elemental to ﬁrm set-up (such as technicians or managers): higher
employer-borne taxes and social security contributions (given wages of employees) lead to
higher unavoidable costs of production unless the ﬁrm can either pass these costs on to its
workers. It is somewhat less obvious, why a ﬁrm should care about the labor tax burden
levied directly on its employees. With regard to the latter, we argue that managers’ and
technicians’ eﬀo r ti se l e m e n t a lf o rt h ee ﬃcient organization of production processes. At
given gross wages, the employee-borne labor tax burden determines net wages. Presuming
that worker eﬀort is a function of net wages, we assume that a higher employee-borne tax
burden reduces eﬀort and, in turn, raises a ﬁrm’s production costs and reduces eﬃciency.
Furthermore, we argue that skilled labor services are primarily tied to a multinational’s
headquarters. Therefore, eﬀort of managers and technicians at the headquarters location
determines such a ﬁrm’s world-wide level of eﬃciency and, hence, production costs for
each production facility.
There is an extensive literature in personnel economics showing that incentives and
diﬀerent compensation policies indeed matter for an individual’s eﬀort.2 Two lines of
research suggest a positive nexus between wages and worker eﬀort–the literature on
eﬃciency wages and the one on equity. Yet, the underlying mechanisms are diﬀerent:
eﬃciency wage theory (see Akerlof and Yellen, 1986) assumes that workers compare op-
portunities outside the ﬁrm with their current pay so that higher net wages reduce the
2See Ehrenberg (1990) and Pendergast (1996) for excellent reviews of work on the eﬀect of compen-
sation policies.
3attractiveness of outside opportunities and, hence, induce higher worker eﬀort;3 in con-
trast, equity theory uses pay comparisons inside the ﬁrm f o rt h el i n kb e t w e e np a ya n d
eﬀort (see Lawler, 1968). Empirically, the nexus between net wages and worker eﬀort
is well documented in empirical work using ﬁeld data (see Lazear, 2000;4 Asch, 1990;
Bognanno and Ehrenberg, 1990; and Kahn and Sherer, 1990).
In the sequel, we apply a model of Lazear (1996b) to look into the role of personal
income taxes borne by managers for a ﬁrm’s proﬁts as we are interested in the question
of where an MNE will decide to locate its headquarters. The MNE’s headquarters can be
located in country A or B, respectively. By deﬁnition, a horizontal MNE will serve con-
sumers in either market from a local production facility. Furthermore, the MNE employs
a manager or technician at its headquarters and this employee’s primary task is organizing
production eﬃciently which we assume to be reﬂected in the positive relationship between
(incompletely observable) manager eﬀort ei with i = A,B and the ﬁrm’s output.
For this, assume that a manager’s wage wi consists of two components: α which is
independent of output and a piece rate component βQi where Qi is the sum of output
sold in the domestic economy qi a n di nt h ef o r e i g ne c o n o m yq∗
i, i.e., Qi = qi + q∗
i
5. The
parameters α and β are chosen by the ﬁrm’s shareholders. Moreover, the manager is
subject to a tax on its income denoted by ti. Accordingly, net of tax pay of the manager
employed by the i−borne MNE respectively is determined as
wi =( α + βQi )(1 − ti) where i = A,B. (2.1)
Output is a function of eﬀort ei, which in itself depends positively on the wage and
3There is a small sub-literature on the impact of taxes on employment versus unemployment in eﬃ-
ciency wage models (see Pisauro, 1991). However, such models have not been used to study employee-
versus employer-borne eﬀects of taxes on MNE activity.
4Using data from Safelite Glass Corporation, a large US installer of automobile glass, Lazear shows
that changing the compensation towards a performance linked pay increased the average productivity.
The productivity eﬀects amount to a 44 percent increase in output per worker. Thus, the author shows
that not only the ﬁrm’s output but also its proﬁts increased with the move towards a system of piece
rate pay. The author concludes that half of the increase in productivity results from the average worker
producing more because of incentive eﬀects (see also Lazear, 1996a). Accordingly, the direct link between
aw o r k e r ’ se ﬀort and a ﬁrm’s output shows that the variables which might inﬂuence an employee’s eﬀort
are of key interest to a company.
5We assume for simplicity that αA = αB = α and βA = βB = β.
4negatively on the tax e0
i(ti) < 0 ,a n dl u c kv. v can also stand for a measurement error.
The measurement of eﬀort is normalized to unity so that output is determined as
Qi = ei + v where i = A,B (2.2)
Furthermore, we follow the related literature in assuming that working involves some
disutility which is captured by the distaste function C(ei),m a i n t a i n i n gC0(ei) > 0 and
C00(ei) > 0. The manager’s labor supply for the i−borne MNE is derived by maximiz-
ing her pay earned from working less the distaste costs involved. From the ﬁrst-order
condition, we obtain
C
0(ei)=β(1 − ti), (2.3)
which suggests that manager eﬀort increases with β and decreases with the tax rate ti.
Thus, higher taxes reduce eﬀort or time of active working.
T h eM N E ’ so b j e c t i v ei st om a x i m i z ei t sp r o ﬁts πi, subject to the wage compensation
it has to pay to its managers.6 Proﬁts depend in each case on expected output E(Qi ):7
πi = E(Qi ) − (α + βei). (2.4)
By choosing α and β accordingly, the ﬁrm can maximise its proﬁts
Max
α,β
(E(Qi) − (α + βei)) = Max
α,β
[ ei − (α + βei)] (2.5)
subject to the manager’s participation constraint. The latter entails that the manager is
willing to take up the job in the i−borne MNE and may be formalized by
(α + βQi )(1 − ti) ≥ C(ei). (2.6)
6We abstract here from other additional variable costs such as interest costs on capital or low-skilled
employee costs, since we focus on the headquarters location choice of the MNE.
7Of course, the MNE’s Qi consists of output in A and B.















such that the manager will supply eﬀort up to the point where her net-of-tax earnings
1 − ti for the last unit of eﬀort supplied just compensate her for the associated marginal
cost of eﬀort C0(ei). Accordingly, we can infer the following relationship between labor
taxes borne by managers and the MNE’s proﬁts:
Proposition 1 The employee-borne income tax negatively inﬂuences an MNE’s proﬁtb y





















i(ti) < 0 and (1 − ti)2 − C0(ei) · (1 − ti)+C(ei) > 0 by assumption.8
Therefore, one can state that the ﬁrm will be concerned with the eﬀective tax burden
faced by its manager since a high tax burden reduces manager eﬀort and thus the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts. Moreover, given that eﬀort decreases with the tax rate e0
i(ti) < 0 , one can infer
that a higher marginal tax burden on labor also reduces proﬁts. Thus, if a ﬁrm may choose
between two headquarters locations which only diﬀer with respect to the marginal tax
8Notice that (1 − ti)2 > 0 and C0(ei) < 0 .
6burden on managers or technicians, it will ceteris paribus decide in favor of the country
where skilled labor faces lower eﬀective average and marginal tax rates.
Moreover, the proﬁts of the MNE are aﬀected under the above mentioned assumptions





dtB =0 ) . We have thus illustrated how an increase in the domestic income
tax rate on managers reduces the attractiveness of a market for headquarters location.
From our analysis, we may infer that a high-income-tax country will therefore rather
host foreign-owned subsidiaries than headquarters. Such a country will conduct less out-
ward FDI than others, since the high income tax negatively inﬂuences manager eﬀort and
productivity as well as ﬁrm output. We will assess this hypothesis empirically in Section
4.
In the following, we turn to the OECD Taxing Wages Approach to show how the
eﬀective tax burden on employees may be determined.
3 The OECD’s Taxing Wages Approach
We compute the eﬀective average and marginal tax rates of employees earning 33%, 100%,
167% or 500% of the average wage in the manufacturing sector for 49 countries in the
year 2002 (see OECD, 2002, and Heady, 2004). According to this approach, the average
eﬀective tax burden TA is deﬁned as the ratio between the sum of the average labor income
tax TL, the social security contributions paid by the employee TSE1 and the social security
contributions paid by the employer TSE2, divided by the sum of the gross wage ˜ w and
the social security contributions paid by the employer TSE2. Accordingly,
T
A =
TL + TSE1 + TSE2
˜ w + TSE2 . (3.11)
Using, for instance, the following numbers for Italy in 2002, one can compute an
eﬀective average tax rate on labor of 45.6 per cent.
7Overview:A v e r a g ee ﬀective tax rates on labor in Italy
in €
1. Gross earnings 20582.5
2. Ded. for social sec. contributions (=8.) 1893.6
3. Taxable income (=1-2) 18688.9
4. Tax liability 4121.2
5. Tax credit 490.6
6. Final tax (=4.-5.) 3630.6
7. State and local income taxes 168.2
8. Employee soc. sec. contributions (=9.2% of 1.) 1893.6
9. Employer soc. sec. contributions (=33.08% of 1.) 6808.7
10. Eﬀective average tax rate (=(6.+8.+9.)/(1.+9.)) 45.6 %
Moreover, we decompose this average eﬀective tax burden into an employee-borne tax
wedge (ITE) and an employer-borne tax wedge (ITR). ITE is deﬁned as the share of the
labor income tax (TL) plus social security contributions paid by the employee (TSE1) and
the overall gross wage plus the employer’s contributions (˜ w+TSE2).I T Ri sd e ﬁned as the
ratio between the employer’s social security contributions (TSE2) and the overall labor




˜ w + TSE2 ; ITR =
TSE2
˜ w + TSE2. (3.12)
Furthermore, given that the progressivity of a tax system also inﬂuences eﬀort and
thus labor supply, we compute the progressivity of each country’s labor tax system which
is relevant for well-paid workers. Accordingly, we compute (a) the ratio of the diﬀerence
between the average eﬀective tax rates for an individual earning 500% and 100% of the
average wage, ITE(500) − ITE(100), and the average eﬀective tax for an individual
earning the average wage in the manufacturing sector and (b) the ratio of the diﬀerence
between the average eﬀective tax rates for an individual earning 100% and 33% of the
average wage, ITE(100)−ITE(33), and the average eﬀective tax for an individual earning








The higher this value is, the stronger is the progressivity of a country’s tax system.
We hypothesize that manager or technician eﬀort declines in the progressivity of the labor
tax for high wages, i.e. ITP500_100.
F i g u r e s1 a , ba n dcs h o wt h ec o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e nt h ee m p l o y e ea n dt h ee m p l o y e rt a x
wedge for an individual earning the average wage, ﬁve times the average wage or 33% of
the average wage in the manufacturing sector in the 49 countries. From Figure 1a one
can see that the employee tax wedge is almost independent of the employer tax wedge.
The mean of the employee tax wedge is 17.5% , the standard deviation is 7.9%, and
the minimum and maximum values are found in Mexico and Denmark with 1.85% and
42.65%, respectively. The mean and standard deviation of the employer tax wedge for
an employee earning the average wage amount to 15.8% and 7.8%, respectively. The
minimum value is recorded for Denmark with 0.6% and the maximum value for Ukraine
with 30.6%. These values of the employer tax wedge do not change much if we consider an
employee earning ﬁve times the average wage. However, given the progressivity of the tax
system, the values for the employee tax wedge change considerably (see Figure 1b). For
an individual with a wage of ﬁve times the country’s average wage, the mean employee
tax wedge amounts to 28.7% and the standard deviation is 12.2%. For low wages, as
depicted in Figure 1c, the mean employee tax wedge is around 11.3% and it is even 0
in Macedonia or Ireland, for instance, whereas it reaches a maximum value of 35.1% in
Denmark. Regarding the employer tax wedge for an employee earning 33% of the average
wage, the mean is slightly higher with 16.3%. The minimum with around 1.8% is reached
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Employer Tax Wedge for 5x the Average Wage



































































































0 10 20 30
Employer Tax Wedge for 33% of Average Wage
Fig. 1c: Employer vs. Employee Tax Wedge for 33% of the Average Wage
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Employee Tax Wedge for Average Wage
Fig.2a: Employee Tax Wedge for Average Wage vs. Tax Progression between Average
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Employee Tax Wedge for 33% of Average Wage
Fig.2b: Employee Tax Wedge for 33% of Average Wage vs. Tax Progression between
33% and 100% of Average Wage
progression measures of the respective tax system (denoted as ITP500_100 and ITP100_33
above) and the employee tax wedge ITE(100) and ITE(33), respectively.
One can note a clear negative relationship. The higher the tax burden of an employee
earning the average wage (or 33% of the average wage), the lower is the progression of the
respective country’s tax system. Or, put diﬀerently, given that a country already has high
labor income taxes and social security contributions borne by employees, it can not aﬀord
to tax higher incomes even more progressively since this would have negative incentive
eﬀects on the employees’ eﬀort.
114 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Empirical hypotheses about the impact of personal income
taxation on bilateral foreign direct investment
As we indicated before, there are two major routes along which taxation of income should
aﬀect the activity of ﬁrms in general and of multinationals in speciﬁc. First, given average
wages gross of taxes, a higher fraction of average wages that is taxed away at the expense
of workers leads to lower worker eﬀort. Higher labor-borne taxes on personal income
should then have a negative impact on productivity and, hence, on the prevalence of
MNEs to locate in such a country. In particular, we argue that countries with very high
labor-borne eﬀective tax rates on personal income will not be candidates for the location
of headquarters, where highly productive labor is particularly important. Accordingly,
we may formulate the ﬁrst testable hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 1: A higher labor-borne eﬀective tax rate on personal income — given gross
wages — reduces a country’s ability to attract headquarters. In particular, a larger dif-
ference in such tax rates between a potential parent and a host country will reduce the
associated bilateral FDI stock.
This argument should be especially important for skilled employees and managers
required in the set-up of headquarters of ﬁrms and, even more so, of multinationals. The
gross income of such employees typically falls in the highest income tax bracket. The
second hypothesis may then be formulated as follows.
Hypothesis 2: A stronger progression of the labor-borne eﬀective tax rate on personal
income — given gross wages and the level of the average labor-borne tax rate on personal
income — reduces a country’s ability to attract headquarters. In particular, a larger dif-
ference in the associated progression between a potential parent and a host country will
reduce the associated bilateral FDI stock.
12One could be tempted to expect similar hypotheses for the employer-borne level and
progression of income tax rates. Yet, employer-borne contributions are not progressive at
all in the sample of economies considered below (see Figures 1a and 1b). However, given
gross wages, the level of employer-borne wage tax contributions represents an additional
cost to the ﬁrm and should inﬂuence an MNE’s location decision. This leads to the last
hypothesis we will consider in the subsequent empirical analysis.
Hypothesis 3: A higher employer-borne eﬀective tax rate on wages — given gross wage
costs — negatively aﬀects a country’s ability to attract headquarters. In particular, a larger
diﬀerence in such tax rates between a potential parent and a host country should negatively
aﬀect the associated bilateral FDI stock.
In the subsequent empirical analysis, we infer these hypotheses, controlling for other
observable variables. It is the aim of the next sub-section to introduce the empirical
speciﬁcation and the variables in use, the sources of data, and summary statistics thereof.
4.2 Speciﬁcation and Data
In the empirical analysis, we use the log of bilateral stocks of outward FDI among 49
economies for the year 2002 (for which data on proﬁt and personal income taxation are
available)9 as the dependent variable. Data on stocks of outward FDI are taken from
UNCTAD’s Foreign Direct Investment database. Regarding notation, we use subscripts i
and j to indicate parent and host countries throughout so that the dependent variable in
the econometric benchmark model may be written as LFDIij.
The explanatory variables used to determine bilateral FDI stocks may be collected
in three categories: gravity model variables (or economic fundamentals) such as parent
9The countries included in our data-set are the following: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Canada, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay.
Given the enormous eﬀort necessary to collect proﬁt taxes and the level as well as eﬀective personal
income tax data for such a wide sample of countries, this paper’s focus has to be on cross-section data
analysis.
13and host country size (GDP), parent and host country average wages per employee, and
bilateral distance between the parent and the host economy (which commonly serves
as a compound measure of bilateral trade and investment costs among these countries);
proﬁt tax variables based on statutory corporate tax rates and depreciation allowances
(or ﬁxed cost deductibility parameters) of the parent and the host economy as well as
two indicator variables reﬂecting whether the credit method or the exemption method are
applied bilaterally to avoid or reduce double taxation of foreign-earned, repatriated proﬁts;
ﬁnally, we use personal income tax variables based on the eﬀective rates of contribution
of employers versus employees at average wages and the progression of the employees’
contribution.
Let us focus more closely on how the variables used in the speciﬁcation are actually
constructed, and what their sources are. Table 1 provides summary statistics we refer to
below, especially, with the personal income tax variables covered.
Gravity model variables
We use the gravity model variables in logarithmic form on the right-hand side of
the empirical model: LGDPi and LGDPj indicate parent and host country log GDP,
respectively (from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2006); LWAGEi and
LWAGEj refer to parent and host country log average wages per worker, respectively (from
OECD(2002) and UN).10 Bilateral distance is measured in kilometers and computed using
the great circle method based on coordinates of the parent and host’s capitals. Again, we
use the log of bilateral distance, LDISTij.
Proﬁtt a xv a r i a b l e s
Regarding the proﬁtt a xv a r i a b l e s ,w eh y p o t h e s i z et h a tp a r e n tc o u n t r yﬁrms will more
likely set up production plants in a host country if the corporate statutory tax rate is
higher at home than abroad (see Egger, Pfaﬀermayr, Loretz, Winner, 2008). To capture
10Markusen (2002) and Blonigen, Davies and Head (2003) use a diﬀerent functional form for two
countries’ GDP than we do, and they employ relative factor endowment variables rather than wages.
However, elements of our specoiﬁcation are based on partial equilibrium reasoning so that relative factor
endowments do not apear. In general, with bilateral rather than multilateral FDI, factor cost variables
are as quasi-exogenous as GDP and can be used instead of relative factor endownment variables.
14this relationship, we introduce the parent-to-host statutory corporate tax rate diﬀerential
(TAXi-TAXj) as an explanatory variable in the model. Moreover, we hypothesize that a
similar diﬀerential for tax deductibility parameters, i.e., depreciation allowances (DEPRi-
DEPRj), exhibits the opposite sign. The reason for the latter is that better depreciation
allowances in the parent country render the set-up of production facilities abroad unattrac-
tive to ﬁrms. On top of these tax rates and depreciation allowances, countries establish
bilateral tax law, mostly through tax treaties. Such treaties have two purposes: to reduce
the proﬁt tax burden on foreign-earned, repatriated proﬁts and to exchange information
to limit multinational ﬁrms’ possibilities of tax avoidance. The net eﬀect of such treaties
is therefore ambiguous. We include two dummy variables that are based on unilateral as
well as bilateral, treaty-based regulations about the regime of double taxation relief in
place: CREDITij(referring to the credit method) and EXEMPTij (referring to the ex-
emption method). One should not expect any particular sign for the parameters of these
dummy variables in the empirical model, since it is impossible to distinguish between
t h et r u ed o u b l et a x a t i o nr e l i e fe ﬀect and the information exchange eﬀect of bilateral tax
treaties. These variables were collected by Egger, Pfaﬀermayr, Loretz, Winner (2008),
using information from national tax codes as well as bilateral tax treaties.
Personal income tax variables
As for personal income tax rates, we use three variables as indicated in Hypotheses
1-3 before. The ﬁrst one is based upon the eﬀective tax rate on personal income borne
by employees with an average wage (ITE). This amounts to the diﬀerence between gross
income visible to the employee and her net income relative to the gross income. In our
data, ITE varies between about 1.9 percent (Mexico) and about 42.7 percent (Denmark)
across countries. Similar to proﬁt tax rates, we use the corresponding diﬀerence in parent-
to-host contributions (ITEi-ITEj). Furthermore, we compute the progression in ITE
between an employee with a wage that is ﬁve times higher than the average and the
average earner relative to the average. We refer to this measure of progression by the
acronym ITP. The latter varies between -0.64 (or about -63.5 percent; Austria) and 3.31
(or about 331 percent; for Mexico) in the data. Similar to ITE, we include the diﬀerence
15between parent and host country (ITPi-ITPj) as a determinant of FDI in our empirical
model.
< Table 1 >
Finally, we include the employer contributions as a counterpart to ITE in the model.
Let us use the acronym ITR for the corresponding variable, which varies between 0 (Aus-
tria, Chile, and New Zealand) and about 30.6 percent (Ukraine) in our data, according
to Table 1. Similar to ITE, we include the parent-to-host diﬀerence (ITRi-ITRj)o ft h i s
variable as a determinant of the parent’s bilateral outward FDI in the model in the model.
4.3 Estimation results
In all estimations carried out, we assume that the stochastic error term is uncorrelated
with variables belonging in the three aforementioned groups of determinants. Generally,
we do not require the disturbances to be identically distributed across country-pairs.
Therefore, we report standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity. Table 2
summarizes the parameter estimates from a set of ordinary least-squares models. We
estimate three models in Table 2 to shed light on the contributions of diﬀerent blocs of
variables to the total variance in LFDI.
< Table 2 >
Model 1 only includes the fundamental gravity model control variables. Not very
surprisingly, these ﬁve variables together with the constant alone explain (the log of)
bilateral outward FDI stocks quite well: they account for more than 56 percent of the
variation in the data.
Adding the mentioned four proﬁt tax variables in Model 2 leads to a non-trivial increase
in explanatory power when using the adjusted R2 (hence, taking the loss of degrees of
freedom in Model 2 relative to Model 1 taking into account): Model 2 explains more than
62 percent of the variation in bilateral FDI, and we may state that it works about as
16well as bilateral gravity models do for the log of bilateral exports. As for the parameter
estimates of the proﬁt tax variables, we ﬁnd — in accordance with our expectations — that
a larger discrepancy in statutory tax rates between the parent and the host country leads
to more outward FDI. The reason is that it then pays oﬀ to locate production abroad for
proﬁt tax reasons. Higher depreciation allowances in the parent country relative to the
host should render the former relatively more attractive for activities involving high ﬁxed
costs — such as headquarters. Hence, we expect a positive parameter for this variable.
Indeed, the point estimate turns out positive, yet we can not estimate the parameter
signiﬁcantly at conventional levels. The negative parameters of the credit and exemption
dummies most likely capture adverse eﬀects on FDI associated with information exchange
eﬀects (and, hence, the reduced possibilities of shifting proﬁts and charging transfer prices
by multinational ﬁrms).
In Model 3, we add the three personal income tax variables to the ones in Model 2.
Several ﬁndings there are worth noting. First of all, the overall explanatory power of the
model is only marginally increased. Yet, this is not surprising. We would have found
the results suspicious, if personal income taxation had turned out more important than
proﬁt taxation for bilateral FDI. Second, the parameters of (ITEi-ITEj)a n d( I T P i-ITPj)
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and negative. The latter results are supportive of
the worker-eﬀort-related Hypotheses 1 and 2 — headquarters are less likely to be located
in countries, where average wage taxes (ITEi-ITEj) or their progression (ITPi-ITPj)a r e
relatively high.11 In other words, countries where skilled workers and managers have to
sacriﬁce a larger portion of their gross wages will less likely host headquarters and conduct
bilateral outward FDI. Third, given gross wages, the employer tax burden negatively
inﬂuences a country’s ability to attract headquarters as suggested by Hypothesis 3, as
these contributions also represent additional costs a ﬁrm has to incur. However, the
latter impact cannot be estimated signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
11Since our primary emphasis is on the role of wage taxes on high-wage income earners such as managers
or technicians, we use ITE(500)-ITE(100)—i.e., the progression of employee-borne wage taxes from the
average wage to ﬁve times the average wage—in percent to deﬁne ITP. We will shed light on the role of
wage progression for low-wage earners based on ITE(100)-ITE(33) in the sensitivity analysis.
17In the remainder of this section, we assess the robustness of these ﬁndings in various
regards: the importance of inﬂuential observations, the sample composition, the inclusion
of additional control variables, and the functional form assumption about of the stochastic
process. Table 3 summarizes the corresponding ﬁn d i n g sw h i c hs h o u l db ec o m p a r e dt ot h e
benchmark results in Model 3 of Table 2.
< Table 3 >
Model 3a in the table represents a least-absolute deviations (median) regression. Over-
all, the parameter estimates in this model are very similar to Model 3 in Table 2. This
suggests that our original ﬁndings were not driven by inﬂuential observations in the tails
of the distribution. Models 3b and 3c indicate that our conclusions for the impact of
personal income tax rates apply qualitatively for both intra-OECD and extra-OECD FDI
relationships. Also the other results in these models are qualitatively similar to each other
and the original ones in Table 2.
Model 3d includes additional control variables such as the diﬀerence in skilled labor
endowments between the parent and the host country (suggested by Markusen, 2002;
using secondary school enrolment ratios from the World Bank’s World Development In-
dicators 2006; not signiﬁcant), the diﬀerence in an index capturing political institutions
between the parent and the host country (using the Polity IV data-set; not signiﬁcant);
the number of years since the last war between the parent and the host country (using the
Armed Conﬂict Dataset provided by the International Peace Research Institute; signiﬁ-
cant at 1 percent); the cumulative number of months of war between the parent and the
host country since 1940 (using the aforementioned Armed Conﬂict Dataset; signiﬁcant
at 1 percent). Descriptive statistics of these variables are provided in Table A1 of the
Appendix. A comparison of the results in Model 3d with those in the original Model 3
indicates that the original ﬁndings were not biased by our focus on a more parsimonious
model.
Model 3e represents a Poisson Pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) model rather
than an ordinary least-squares approach. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) indicated for
18trade data that depending on the nature of the measurement error of bilateral exports,
heteroskedasticity may lead to biased parameter estimates. This bias can be avoided in a
PPML model with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The same argument applies,
of course, with data on bilateral stocks of outward FDI. Again, the results indicate that
such a bias seems to be of minor importance in our application. This conclusion is derived
from the similarity of the parameter estimates in Models 3 and 3e. However, the negative
parameter of (ITEi-ITEj) can not be estimated signiﬁcantly any more. Yet, that one
of the tax progression variable (ITPi-ITPj) which seems more relevant for manager or
technician income, even gained in importance relative to the original results.
Finally, Model 3f estimates a log-linear FDI speciﬁcation as in Model 3, but it includes
the parent-to-host diﬀerence in the wage tax progression for low-income employees. The
latter variable is based on the progression of the wage tax from one third of the average
wage to the average wage in percent. However, it turns out that this variable does
not exhibit an impact on FDI stocks which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (see the
parameter estimate and standard error for Model 3f at the bottom of the table). Hence,
the results conﬁrm our view that the progression for high-wage earners is more important
for FDI location than that of low-wage earners.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper reports on a large data-set on labor income taxation among 49 economies.
We provide descriptive comparisons with respect to the taxation of the salaries of average
income earners and the corresponding progression.
We set up a stylized partial equilibrium model to analyze the implications of eﬀective
taxation of labor for proﬁts and, hence, the location decision of a multinational enterprise.
We argue that managers’ and technicians’ eﬀort is elemental for the eﬃcient organization
of production processes. At given gross wages, the employee-borne labor tax burden de-
termines net wages. Presuming that worker eﬀort is a function of net wages, we assume
that a higher employee-borne tax burden reduces eﬀort and, in turn, raises a ﬁrm’s pro-
19duction costs and reduces eﬃciency. Furthermore, we argue that skilled labor services
are primarily tied to a multinational’s headquarters. Eﬀort of managers and technicians
at the headquarters location determines such a ﬁrm’s world-wide level of eﬃciency and,
hence, production costs for each production facility. A higher employee-borne income tax
negatively inﬂuences an MNE’s proﬁt by reducing manager eﬀort. Thus, if a ﬁrm may
choose between headquarters locations which diﬀer with respect to the marginal tax bur-
den on well-paid workers such as managers and technicians, it will ceteris paribus decide
in favor of a country where well-paid labor faces lower eﬀective average and marginal
taxes.
In the empirical part of the paper, we shed light on how important the taxation of
labor income is for outward foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to proﬁtt a x a t i o n .
Moreover, we consider the role of the contributions of employers versus those of employees
across four centiles of the distribution of gross wages: at 33 percent, 100 percent, 167
percent, and 500 percent of the average. Not surprisingly, personal income tax rates turn
o u ts o m e w h a tl e s si m p o r t a n tt h a np r o ﬁt tax rates (in terms of their marginal contribution
to explaining the variance of bilateral outward FDI stock data). However, the employee-
b o r n ep a r to fl a b o rt a x e sd e t e r m i n e sb i l a t e r a lF D Is i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero: both
a higher employee-borne tax on average wages and, in particular, a higher progression
from the average wage to ﬁve times the average wage is less conducive to headquarters
location and, hence reduces a country’s bilateral outward FDI.
20212223Appendix
Table A1 contains summary statistics for the additional control variables used in the
sensitivity analysis (Model 3d in Table 3).
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